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LAW AND THEOLOGY: REFLECTIONS ON
WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN FROM A
FRANCISCAN PERSPECTIVE
REV. JOHN J. COUGHLIN, O.F.M.*

When I was first asked in March of 2000 to speak at this
conference on the topic of "law and theology," many thoughts
crossed my mind. I could address: the role of religion in
American political life, euthanasia, medieval canon law and
theology, the death penalty, the Jewish origins of the Pauline
perspective on law, the ethics of DNA experimentation, Muslim
theology and law, the relation between Marxist political theory
and Christian eschatology, or several other "light" issues. Upon
second thought, perhaps a more straight-forward approach
would be beneficial. I might review the plan of salvation history,
and then as a true academic, propose alternatives! Because the
ten days in March, during which I prepared these remarks,
coincided with a not uneventful time in my own life, I decided to
remain on familiar terrain. As an unworthy disciple of the
"lesser brother" from Assisi, I chose to speak briefly about
Franciscan theology and law.
Specifically, I shall consider a question that has been the
focus of a great deal of theological discussion during the course of
the last century: "What does it mean to be a human being?" The
perennial nature of this broad issue, the "anthropological
question" as the theologians refer to it, guarantees that its
discussion will continue well into the current century. Desiring
to maintain at least some semblance of intellectual prudence, I
have elected to use my twenty minutes simply to introduce the
question within the context of my own modest understanding of
J.C.D., J.C.L., Pontifical Gregorian University; J.D., Harvard Law School;
Th.M., Princeton Theological Seminary; M.A., Columbia University; B.A., Niagara
University. Fr. Coughlin was a law clerk to the Hon. Francis X. Altimari of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and currently serves as
Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law and Spiritual
Director, St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, New York. The author wishes to thank
his colleague, Professor Michael Simons, for his helpful suggestions.
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Franciscan theology and spirituality. I must acknowledge that
the Jesuits sponsor most of the Catholic law schools in this
country. Moreover, our own beloved St. John's University abides
in the tradition of the great Vincentian visionaries, Saints
Vincent de Paul and Louise de Merillac. As a product of both
Vincentian and Jesuit education myself, I am certainly deeply
Among us at today's conference are also
grateful.
representatives of law schools from other faith traditions. Aware
of the various faith traditions, what I shall discuss from a
Franciscan perspective is a fundamental anthropology in the
best meaning of the words "catholic" and "ecumenical." My
remarks this morning are shared with the hope that the
connection between the theological query and the law will be
evident. Please allow me to speak first of liberal theory, then of
the Franciscan insight, and finally to pose some questions for us
as legal educators.
I.

LIBERAL THEORY

Every system of law reflects certain foundational
assumptions about what it means to be human.' The concept of
justice operative in the legal culture of the modern liberal state,
for example, tends to manifest the anthropological assumptions
of the classical liberal political theory.2 Leading proponents of
the pristine liberal theory, such as Hobbes and Locke, placed a
great deal of importance on individual autonomy. The liberal
theorists viewed the human person as a radically autonomous
individual, who consented to leave the freedom of the state of
nature, and to enter the social contract in order to protect the
natural rights of life, liberty, and property. 3 This fundamental
1 On several occasions, Pope John Paul II has highlighted the importance of
correct anthropology for law. See Ioannes Paulus PP. II, "Allocutiones: Ad Rotae
Romanae Auditores coram admissos," 79 ACTA APOSTOLICA SEDIS 1453, 1454-58

(1987) (hereinafter AAS); Ioannes Paulus PP. II, "Allocutiones:Ad Romanae Rotae
Auditores simul cum officialibus et advocatis coram admissos, anno forensi ineunte,"
80 AAS 1178, 1180-81 (1988); see also GIANFRANCO GHIRLANDA, IL DIRITTO NELLA
CHIESA MISTERO DI COMMUNIONE, COMPENDIO DI DIRITTo ECCLESIALE 15-29 (1990).
2 See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 115-16

(1987).
3 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82-84 (Michael Oakeshott, ed. 1957); see
also JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 364-365 (Peter Laslett ed.
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) ("There is another Power in every Commonwealth,
which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the Power every
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anthropological assumption has produced a great deal of
individual freedom that remains characteristic of the modern
democratic society. When understood in the proper perspective,
I see autonomy and the correlative suspicion of government
power as important goods. At the same time, the hermeneutics
of autonomy and suspicion have tended to affect the legal order
and culture in ways that seem, to me, to detract from a balanced
anthropological perspective.
As an illustration, one might consider the statement of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,4 where the plurality
opined: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life."5 At first glance, the dicta might seem
perfectly unremarkable. On a deeper level of analysis, however,
one might pose the anthropological query: does the plurality's
reasoning on liberty reflect the anthropological assumptions of
classical liberal political theory? Does it repudiate a more
complete and traditional understanding of the human person
which has been operative in the Western tradition, and
continues to underpin our very notions of culture, law, and the
human good? More specifically, the Casey pronouncements seem
to reveal at least two broad areas of concern regarding the
anthropological foundation of the law: (1) the relativity of all
moral value; and (2) an incomplete account of the human good.
First, the notion of autonomy embedded in the Casey dicta
lends itself to an image of the individual who is in possession of
unrestricted freedom, and whose conscience constitutes its own
Because the individual consents to be
moral legislator. 6
Man naturally had before he entered into Society."). Espousing a more optimistic
view of human nature, later philosophers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and
Ralph Waldo Emerson, sought to liberate the native and spontaneous goodness of
the human person which, they thought, was inhibited and warped by society.
Whatever their stance toward the state of nature, all of the theorists championed
the triumph of individualism. See generally JEAN-JACQUEs ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 4-18 (G. D. H. Cole trans., 1950); RALPH WALDO
EMERSON, ESSAYS 389-401 (1951).

4 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
5 Id. at 851.

6 See Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Litterae Enclyclicae: Cunctis catholicae Ecclesiae
episcopis de quibusdam quaestionibusfundamentalibusdoctrinae moralis Ecclesiae,

85 AAS 1133, 1133-1228 (1994).
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governed, the only purpose for which coercive government power
may be used is to prevent harm to others. 7 The absence of an
objective moral measure makes it difficult to know what
constitutes the harm. Consequently, discussion of a universal
human nature through which transcendent principles of moral
law are available to each person is met with skepticism at best.8
Rather, all moral value is understood as contextual and relative.
Unfortunately, a long line of United States Supreme Court
precedents such as Dred Scott v. Sandford9 and Korematsu v.
United States ° demonstrate the contextual value of human
freedom. As the Supreme Court's abortion decisions illustrate,
starting with Roe v. Wade, relativity applies even to the value of
human life in the womb."
The contextual and relative meaning attributed to moral
value deprives law of an objective moral basis. This rift between
law and moral value raises a serious question about the law's
power to bind. 12 Apart from the coercive power of the state, why
7

See

JOHN

STUART

MILL,

On Liberty, UTILITARIANISM,

LIBERTY

AND

95-96 (1951) reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF
JOHN STUART MILL (Maurice Cowling, ed., The New American Library 1968) ("[the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others"). This principle
exerted an enormous influence on the development of the modern Anglo-American
legal tradition.
8 The prominent and influential American jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
drew a sharp distinction between law and morality. Legal positivism and relativism
so suited the needs of the radically autonomous individual that even the common
law with its deep roots in natural justice and English custom and tradition was for
the most part abrogated in favor of statutory provisions and administrative
regulation. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 461-62 (1897).
9 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-04 (1857) (preventing a human being, born in the
United States, from exercising federal diversity jurisdiction on the ground that no
Negro, free or slave, could be a citizen of the United States).
10 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (upholding the federal government's
incarceration and deprivation of liberty of all human beings of Japanese origin
during World War H).
11 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (noting that "the unborn have never been recognized
in the law as persons in the whole sense").
12 This is not to suggest that positive law ought to be absolutely synonymous
with the moral order. It is not the purpose of the civil government to prohibit or
penalize an immoral act simply because it is immoral. The law of the state extends
its competence over morality only to the extent that it affects the public realm.
Libel, for example, is illegal because it violates the personal right of another to a
good reputation; likewise, peijury prevents the administration of justice; and
abortion destroys innocent and powerless human life. A human being's personal
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
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should a given individual follow the dictates of law if it has no
power to bind him in conscience? The contextual and relative
meaning of the moral value could place the individual in the
position to reject the law as eviscerated of moral authority.
Rather, it is the just person who, even in the face of legal
decisions that plainly affront human decency, contributes to
public life while exercising every lawful means to correct the
13
societal inequity.
Second, the anthropological assumption of a radically
autonomous individual may enshrine certain values as
foundational to the law at the cost of excluding other significant
human values. When legal relationships are defined primarily
in terms of individual rights, this language of rights would seem
to value the individual over and against the common good. 14 In
the free market, this anthropology of self-interest dictates
competition and success that is measured in terms of prestige,
wealth, and power.' 5 The law is designed to ensure equality and
neutrality as individuals compete.' 6 Such an understanding of

commitment to the virtue of honesty, however, per se, has only a proximate
relationship to the public order. Thus, purely internal acts of virtue and vice, while
the subject of morality, do not necessarily and always constitute part of the public
realm. Moral principles, of course, do influence and contribute to the development of
law. The mens rea requirement for criminal liability was a principle of the natural
law long before it was accepted in the common law. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 260-90 (1980). For an opposing view in which the role of
natural law is rejected, see H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separationof Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
13 From the Christian perspective, this is in no way intended to diminish the
important role of non-violent civil disobedience in certain circumstances. See
generally DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, THE COST OF DISCIPLESHIP 22-23 (R. H. Fuller
trans., 1959) (stating that Bonhoeffer believed that it was not enough to follow
Christ by preaching, teaching, and writing, but called earnestly for "Christian
action and self-sacrifice").
14 Some would go so far as to suggest that there is no common good. For a
description of this as a possible position among several alternatives, see Frank
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
JudicialModels of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 145-48 (1977).
15 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF

THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Canaan ed., The Modern Library 1957) (1776)
(discussing the prime psychological drive of men; self interest, and its beneficial
impact on the free market).
16 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (guaranteeing all citizens equal
protection under the law); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U.L.
REV. 1, 4 (1992) (stating that the unifying theme of due process has been a
commitment to the values of law, participation, and equality).
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the human person may leave little room for other human values
such as self-sacrifice and self-transcendence. One might ask
whether such an anthropological understanding provides an
adequate and balanced account of the human good. The paradox
for the liberal state remains that even as it defines freedom as
the absence of government restraint on the individual, it
depends on acts of self-sacrifice-indeed sometimes of heroic
proportions-for its continued well being and survival.
A
possible danger for law, thus understood, lies in its inability to
embody the deepest ideals and aspirations of culture. That the
gruesome methods of partial-birth abortion, described by both
the majority and the dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart,now enjoy
constitutional protection raises grievous doubt about the law's
17
pedagogical role in relation to human ideals and aspirations.
The problems with the anthropological perspective are
perhaps self-evident, and others from diverse viewpoints have
adequately demonstrated the limited horizon into which it forces
the possibilities for the human person.'8 In the philosophical
and religious language of one thinker: "this order distorts the
correct proportions in the relations between the person and the
society or community and-on a different level-between the
human creature and the Creator." 19 Dissenting in Stenberg v.
Carhart, Justice Antonin Scalia labeled the five-member
majority's reasoning "absurd," but nonetheless, expressed
optimism that the whole line of abortion decisions would
someday be overruled. 20
Consistent with this "catholic
optimism," Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger has described the
possibility of an essential change in culture and society at the
dawn of the third millennium:
[Tihere is [something] apparent... a consciousness of the
incomparable newness of the present situation, of a change in
17 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2605-8, 2624-25, 2637-40 (2000).

18 See GLENDON, supra note 2, at 114-42 (discussing the consequences of an
anthropological perspective on theories of legal rights); see also YVES R. SIMON, THE
DEFINITION OF MORAL VIRTUE 1-45 (Vukan Kuic ed., 1986) (discussing the confusion
created for an understanding of moral virtue). For a radical critique from the
perspective of the human possibilities, see ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION:
AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY (1984).
19 KAROL WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON 165 (Andrzej Potocki trans., D. Reidel
Publishing Co. 1979) (1969).
20 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2621-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

20001

WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN

the world and mankind that cannot be measured by the usual
norms of historical change as they have always existed but
rather signifies an epochal transformation for which there is no
adequate comparison. This fact-that something wholly new is
happening to man and to the world in a culture in which
scientific and technical self-determination is becoming ever
more total-is the reason for the crisis that is occurring in a
tradition that has no compunction about explaining itself, if
need be, in terms of the scientifically proven behavioral
patterns of higher animals but can discover no binding force in
human history as such and, in consequence, raises afresh the
whole question of validity even with respect to tradition-bound
institutions like the Catholic Church which seem to be
21
unequivocally characterized by clearly defined norms.
If Ratzinger's analysis of an "epochal transformation" is correct,
the time may be ripe for a revision of fundamental anthropology.
Among the anthropological assumptions embedded in
classical liberal political theory remains its dislocation from
history and tradition. Not only does this assumption tend to
relativize moral value, but also it is an understanding of the
human person that seems to belie the notion of an objective
moral truth precisely because it rejects the tradition from which
the objective norm developed in history. Reading the signs of the
times of the advent of a major cultural shift, Ratzinger calls for a
new anthropological foundation that remains fully faithful to the
tradition of Christian faith and truth.22 Given that the modern
liberal state also tends to be characterized by secularism and
religious pluralism, the possibility of finding acceptance for such
a traditional Christian anthropological perspective will be a
great challenge.
21 JOSEPH RATZINGER, PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGY: BUILDING STONES

(Sr. Mary Frances McCarthy trans., Ignatius
Press 1987) (1982). After setting out the problem, Cardinal Ratzinger addressed the
FOR A FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY 15-16

issue in "AnthropologicalFoundationof the Concept of Tradition."See id. at 85-100.

22 See id. at 89-94. Such an understanding would seem to require a
multidisciplinary approach that typifies comparative legal analysis. In the words of
John Paul II, "L'antropologia cristiana... considera la persona umana in tutte le
sue dimensioni: la terrena e l'eterna, la naturale e la trascendente." ("Christian
anthropology... considers the human person in all dimensions... earthly and
eternal, natural and transcendent."). AAS, supra note 1, at 1181; see also 1 LUIGI M.

RULLA, S.J., ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE CHRISTIAN VOCATION: INTERDISCIPLINARY

BASES 71-77 (1986) (stating that "one cannot respond to the call of the Father
through Christ and in the Spirit if one holds that man is self-sufficient").
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A prominent twentieth-century theologian, Hans Urs von
Balthasar, proffered that one possible element to the resolution
lies in a retrieval of the Franciscan insight into the human
person situated in history.23 To develop a complete Christian
anthropology is far beyond what can be said in these brief
remarks. 24 Rather, what follows is intended as one element in
the anthropological foundation, and is proffered to redress the
anthropological assumption of the modern liberal state. 25 In
particular, it challenges the relativism of moral value and offers
an account of the human good of post-Enlightenment
anthropology.

23 HANS URS VON BALTHASAR, A THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 133 (1967).
24 Consistent with its methodological principles, Vatican II sought to cull the
elements of a Christian anthropology with a grounding in Sacred Scripture. There
are five biblical themes that seem essential: (1) the human being as creature; (2) the
human being in a covenant relationship with the Lord; (3) the effects of original sin,
"lapsarian man;" (4) the Redemption wrought by the "new Man" in the person of
Jesus Christ; (5) the possibilities for self-transcendence. See LUIGI M. RULLA ET AL.,
Anthropology of the Christian Vocation, Conciliar and PostconciliarAspects, in,

VATICAN II ASSESSMENT AND PERSPECTIVES: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AFTER (1962-

1987), vol. 2, 402, 402-59 (Rene Latourelle trans., 1989).
2 As a complement to its biblical foundation, Christian anthropology has long
included certain philosophical principles. Its classic expression can be found in the
work of St. Thomas Aquinas. Thomas understood the human person to be a
composite of body and soul created by God. The soul possesses rationality, free will,
and immortality as its primary characteristics. Although the human being shares
appetites for self-preservation with all other animals such as fear, anger, hunger,
thirst, and sex-drive, the rational soul places humanity a quantum leap above
instinctual drives. What distinguishes the human being from the other animals is
his ability to think, reflect, and act freely. These are both the prerequisites and
constitutive elements of the human act. 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, 363-502 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger
Brothers, Inc. 1st American ed. 1926).
The Thomistic notion of the human being as a rational animal derives in part
from the thought of Aristotle. Nature in the physics of Aristotle signifies entity,
essence, whatness, quiddity in relation to action, movement, growth, and
development. A nature is a way of being which does not possess its state of
accomplishment instantly but is designed to reach it through progression. Building
upon the Aristotelian framework, St. Thomas transcended it to articulate a
Christian synthesis of faith and reason. See FREDERICK C. COPLESTON, AQUINAS
220-23 (1970); see also BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY 13-20
(1979) (discussing contemporary attempts to fashion theological anthropologies
consistent with the Thomistic understanding); BALTHASAR, supra note 23.
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II.

THE FRANCISCAN INSIGHT

St. Francis of Assisi lived during the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, when Western Europe found itself in the midst of an
epochal transformation. 26 The old feudal ways and customs were
eroding as commerce and trade shifted the center of culture to
the emerging city-states. The monastic communal life, that kept
culture alive after the demise of ancient Rome, was proving too
insular to satisfy the spiritual hunger emanating from the new
urban form of life. The new centers of learning at Paris,
Bologna, and Oxford were expanding into influential
universities. 27 The law, along with the universities, was pointing
to the need for a revival of the ancient notions of ius naturale
which, grounded in human nature, would yield principles
universally applicable to all peoples and cultures. 28 Thus, the
complex interaction of many different levels of reality-cultural,
religious, legal, and financial-evoked the need for a fresh
articulation of what it meant to be human.
The new
anthropological perspective did not exclude a certain degree of
personal autonomy nor the suspicion of established institutions
such as the feudal form of government and the corruption of the
Church. It remained, nonetheless, a fundamental understanding
of the human person set forth in the ancient truth of the Hebrew
Bible and further developed in Christian tradition.
A.

The FaithExperience of St. Francis
Francis Bernadone, the son of a prosperous cloth merchant,
was a gifted and popular citizen of Assisi, one of the new thriving
city-states replacing the feudal system.29 As a citizen of Assisi,
the young Francis experienced military defeat by the
neighboring city of Perugia. He was also incarcerated and
suffered a prolonged illness that proved to be a powerful
purgation reforming his interior life.30 He had a religious
26

See ARNALDO FORTINI, FRANCIS OF ASSISI, 1-84 (Helen Moak trans., The

Crossroad Publishing Co. 1981).
27 See HAROLD J. BERMAN,

LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE

WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 160-64 (1983).
28 See BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL
LIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW 76 (1997).

29 See FORTINI, supra note 26, at 113.
30 See id. at 119-65.
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experience that gifted him with a deep faith in Jesus Christ as
"the way and the truth and the life." 31 Francis left his family
and sought solitude to discern the meaning of the supernatural
stirrings within his soul. 32 He entered into the process of
discerning his vocation. Transformed by the humility that flows
from acceptance of one's own "creaturehood," Francis of Assisi
renounced his status in the rising bourgeois class of the
thirteenth century. 33 His faith led him to embrace the fullness of
time in Christ with respect for all of creation, gratitude for its
redemption, and hope for its consummation. This consciousness
was grounded in the Christian understanding of one universal
human nature and moral law. This consciousness enabled a
harmonious weave of interpersonal and environmental
34
relationships.
In the faith experience of St. Francis, there remained a
tension between suspicion of the institution and the Saint's
profound love for the Church and its Sacraments. Rather than
entering traditional monastic life or becoming a priest, Francis
discovered a way to contribute to the cultural shift of the
thirteenth century. He and his followers vowed to live in
poverty, chastity, and obedience-they called themselves the
"lesser brothers" (friars minor). 35 Living in the cities, they
preached the gospel of Christ's love for all humanity to the new
urban populous. 36 When Clare of Assisi, whose family was of the
noble class, joined Francis, she and her followers formed a
communal compliment to the friars.3 7 Soon thereafter, many lay
persons committed themselves to living the Franciscan vision in
their familial and professional lives. Francis and Clare insisted
that Franciscan life and ministry be centered in the eucharistic
life of the Church. Francis traveled to Rome to obtain approval
31 John 14:6.
32 See FORTINI, supra note 26, at 185-203.
33 See id. at 113, 203-06, 229.

34 See id. at 1-84 (describing the social and economic conditions in thirteenthcentury Assisi).
35 See id. at 292-306. "During the day they went into the fields to help the
farmers with their work; at night they remained for long periods kneeling before a
bare wooden cross." Id. at 278.
36 See id. at 266-326. "Love and fear God and make worthy penitence for your
sins." Id. at 278.
37 See id. at 327-66. "Francis cut Claire's hair himself and gave her a new
name: Agnes." Id. at 349.
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for the Franciscan way of life from the Pope.38 The Pontiff's
blessing opened the institutional Church to receive the charism
of the many brothers, sisters, and laity who followed the little
poor man from Assisi. The early Franciscans thus initiated a
movement that helped to reform the Catholic Church and
39
transform the war-torn society of the medieval city-states.
B.

Creationand Anthropology

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, 40 as a member of the Order
of Friars Minor and a professor at the University of Paris, set the
experience of Francis into logical order. The starting point for
Francis's theological reflection can be located in his deep
appreciation of creation and nature. In his poem, The Canticle of
Creation, Francis referred to "Brother Sun, Sister Moon, Sister
Water and Brother Fire."4 1 According to Bonaventure, this
anthropomorphic tendency in Francis's thought disclosed a
perspective on what it means to be a human person. In
accepting the reality that he was created in the image and
likeness of the Creator, Francis humbly recognized his place in
the created order as a being subject to a higher and life-giving
law. The Franciscan insight into anthropology commences with
the fundamental dignity of the human person. This dignity is
ontological in the sense that it belongs to every human being in
virtue of creation from the moment of life's beginning in the
womb to its passing through death to a new life. Moreover, as
Bonaventure interprets it, Francis understood that material
creation reveals the glory of the divine mystery. While humanity
represented the zenith of material creation, all created life and
nature were sacred as a manifestation of the divine love. In
creation, the Creator emptied Himself in a super-abundant
beauty. Rather than understanding the human being as relating
to other individuals, institutions, and the environment as the
38 See id. at 293-302. "So it was that they found themselves facing each other,
the fool of Assisi, kneeling with his companions on the rich mosaic, and the most
powerful of all the popes who has succeeded to the throne of Saint Peter." Id. at 294.
39 See id. at 252-326.
40 For a biography of St. Bonaventure, see Jacques Guy Bougerol, SAINT
BONAVENTURE: UN AITRE DE SAGASSE (1966).
41 Francis of Assisi, The Canticle of Brother Sun, in FRANCIS & CLARE: THE
COMPLETED WORKS 37-39 (Regis J. Armstrong, O.F.M. CAP. & Ignatius C. Brady,
O.F.M. trans., Paulist Press 1982).
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means to a private end, Franciscan anthropology posited a
communal harmony based on a common "creaturehood." The
material environment was not valued because it supplied a
pleasant backdrop for gratification of subjective preferences.
Instead, the Franciscans respected the environment because it
revealed the glory of God. The human person was thus in
relation to material creation as an aspect of the human quest to
discover the divine.
C.

Christology and Anthropology

Bonaventure's interpretation of history focused on the
Incarnation, so that in Christ, the fullness of being having been
42
revealed, new possibilities were opened for human experience.
In his biography of St. Francis, Bonaventure described the
ongoing process of conversio, in which self-centeredness was
transformed. 43 The culmination of the process in the life of St.
Francis was, for Bonaventure, the stigmata in which Francis
became so Christlike that he developed the very wounds of the
Savior. 44 As then Fr. Ratzinger stated it in his doctoral thesis,
45
"Bonaventure sees Francis as the eschatological praeco Dei."
In his humility and poverty, the Poverello entered the fullness of
time, the redemptive moment, and in joy and peace embraced all
material creation. Bonaventure interpreted history in such a
way that the Paschal event revealed the fullness of the human
possibilities. The emptying, death and resurrection of the Son,
especially as modeled by the humility and poverty of Francis,
46
served as the paradigm for all human meaning.
See BALTHASAR, supra note 23, at 133-35.
43 "De perfecta conversione eius ad Deum et de reparatione trium ecclesiarum,"
8 S. BONAVENTURAE, Legenda Maior, in OPERA OMNIA 507-10.
42

4

See id. at 542-45.

45 JOSEPH RATZINGER, THE THEOLOGY OF HISTORY IN ST. BONAVENTURE 32

(1971).
46 The theological anthropologies of Saints Thomas and Bonaventure shared
the following characteristics:
(1) essence common to all human beings which has remained unchanged
since Adam, and which includes rational nature and free will (2) the
preternatural human being became the natural human being through the
Fall as a result of original sin (3) each human being has a historical
existence which makes the person unique, identical to none other, in the
eyes of God (4) the natural state of humanity needed the Redemption
wrought by Christ for fulfillment.
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Balthasar suggests that the christocentric interpretation of
history may be understood by analogy to the aesthetic in human
experience. 47 Art requires the harmonious relationship of every
part to the whole. To strike a single word from the poem, to
distort a chisel groove in the sculpture, to remove a patch of color
from the painting, or to miss a solitary note from the symphony
impairs or even destroys the whole.4 8 So too it is the complex
and dynamic unity of spirit and matter, body and soul, that
comprises the human person. In this sense, the human person
may be understood as the longing of all creation, the unity of
spirit and matter. As Bonaventure puts it:
For the human body possesses the noblest constitution and
organization that exists in nature, and therefore it finds its
fulfillment only in the noblest form of nature. The character of
the soul through which she is able to be united to a body is
something that touches what is most49 essential to her and is the
most excellent character of the soul.
The glorified body of the risen Christ "shows an example
destined for all risen human bodies," the reflection of the spirit
in materiality.5 0 In Bonaventure's thought, the impressio of the
stigmata signified that humanity sits always prone on the edge
of an eschatological era. The salvation event was not understood
as something strange and different, or as something wholly
apart from human experience and history, but rather as the
example of transformation which permitted the fulfillment of the
individual, the community, and all humanity.
Bonaventure expressed a medieval longing for a deeper
meaning within human experience, and for institutional
structures that foster such meaning. What he expressed may
Id. For a more nuanced comparison of Saints Thomas and Bonaventure on the
human soul, see ETIENNE GILSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. BONAVENTURE 285-308
(Iltyd Trethowan & Frank J. Sheed trans., 1965).
47 BALTHASAR, supra note 23, at 170.
48 See id.
49 2 SENT., distinctio 1, pars 2, articulus 3, quaestio 2, S.BONAENTURA OPERA
OMNIA, vol.II, 50 ("Corpus enim humanum nobilissima complexione et
organizatione, quae sit in natura, est organizatum et complexionatum; ideo non
completur nec natum est compleri nisi nobilissima forma sive natura. Illud ergo,
quo anima est unibilis corpori, tale dicit quid essentiale respiciens, quod est
nobilissimum in anima ....- ).
5o "[E]xemplarem
praeferens pulcritudinem
suscitandorum
corporum
humanorum...."8 S. BONAENTURAE, Lignum Vitae, in OPERA OMNIA 81.
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contribute to the resolution of the anthropological question at
the heart of justice. For the Christian, the ideas of Christ should
never be separated from his humanity. The dynamic action of
the fully human, fully divine Christ in world history should not
be separated from the culture and legal order either. The
Christian perspective does not focus merely on the external
juridical structure, but on the intellectus that animates the
outward form. Franciscan humanism rests upon the truth
revealed in the human person of Christ that informs the
anthropology underpinning the culture and legal order.
D. Eschatology and Anthropology
The context of Bonaventure's approach was in no small part
a response to Joachim of Fiore's interpretation of history.5 '
Joachim was the intellectual spokesperson for a millenialist
movement that interpreted history as moving beyond the need
for institution, law, and sacrament. The departure point of
Joachim's interpretation of history was not linear in the sense
that the New Testament followed upon the Old Testament,
52
rather he posited a symbolic mirroring of one in the other.
Based on this diptych of the Testaments, Joachim developed a
triadic scheme in which the New Testament or Age of the Son
was to be fulfilled in a third, eschatological period, the Age of the
Spirit.53 The dawning of the Joachimist "spirit age" would mark
the demise of sacrament and law as symbolic expressions of the
54
objective moral order.
Bonaventure, without entirely repudiating Joachim's
approach, developed the Franciscan insight that creation or
materiality already contains within it the possibility of the
eschatological.
For Bonaventure, the spirit age, although
incomplete, already existed in the here and now within the
51 On the influence of Joachim's thought in the thirteenth century, see
MARJORIE REEVES, THE INFLUENCE OF PROPHESY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES: A
STUDY OF JOACHIMIsM 3-228 (1969).
52 See id. at 16-27.
53 See id. In his doctoral dissertation, then Fr. Ratzinger provided a full

analysis of the relation of Joachim's thought to St. Bonaventure's understanding of
history. RATZINGER, supra note 45, at 104-18. See also BALTHASAR, supra note 23,
at 131-35.
54 See REEVES, supra note 51, at 16-27; see also BALTHASAR, supra note 23, at

131-35.
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visible structures and signs of the institutional Church.55 While
it maintained a linear notion of history, Bonaventure held that
the fullness of time had already been revealed, although in a
veiled manner, through the Word and the Incarnation. This was
not merely a theological debate. When he was called to serve as
the seventh General of the Franciscan Order, Bonaventure
combated Joachim's view of history, which had been adopted by
the spiritualist members of the Order. 56 Bonaventure described
the freedom and autonomy of the young Francis who renounced
the comfortable yet oppressive world of his wealth-consumed
father so as to discover a form of participation in solidarity with
others. The Seraphic Doctor also appreciated the healthy
suspicion of Francis and his early followers toward the
institutions of the medieval Church. Bonaventure affords an
understanding of Franciscanism that exhibits a deep trust and
respect for the Church, its authority, and sacraments-even
while it recognizes that the Church remains semper reformanda.
In Bonaventure's interpretation of the early Franciscan
experience, the Church's sacraments and law were to reflect an
anthropology of freedom, participation, solidarity, healthy
suspicion, respect, trust, and self-sacrifice in the human person
created in the image of the divine mystery.
Rejecting a dualism between materiality and spirit, body
and soul, and in the human person and the Church, Bonaventure
posited a dynamic unity in which the outward form is itself
graced because it manifests the inner intellectus. All of creation
is the vestige of the Creator,5 7 and the wounds of the Redeemer,
as mirrored in the body of St. Francis, are the sacred signs of
self-emptying love.58

Similarly, the outward structure of the

Church serves as sacrament to reveal a deep inner reality. San
Damiano and the Portiuncula must be repaired so that Francis
may dwell within them in joy and peace. 59 The Rule must be
approved by the Roman Pontiff to allow the Order "to proceed in
55 See Lignum Vitae, supra note 50, at 79-80.
56 See JOHN MOORMAN, A HISTORY OF THE FRANCIsCAN ORDER: FROM ITS
ORIGINS TO THE YEAR 1517, 140-54 (1968); ROSALIND BROOKE, EARLY FRANCISCAN
GOVERNMENT: ELIAS TO BONAVENTURE 270-85 (1959).
57 See 5 S. BONAVENTURAE, Itenerarium Mentis in Deum, in OPERA OMNIA,

296-99.
58 See Legenda Maior,supra note 43, at 542-45.
59 See id. at 507-10.
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holiness and justice" before God.60 For, the grace of conversio
does not replace nature, but transforms it.
As Balthasar stated it, Bonaventure's thought exemplified
"the medieval longing to move from the letter to the spirit, from
the institution and the sacrament to the intellectus within
them.., a growing awareness that the 'peoples' could only take
from the Church (and its mission) its 'form' if they found in the
form that intellectus which would impart to it, beyond its naked
factualness, an inner necessity of salvation history."61 For this
reason, Balthasar explained: "the spiritualists, following
Joachim, reform out of a secret resentment against the
hierarchic institution .

. .

. Bonaventure, on the other hand,

reforms out of childlike obedience to the Church, in which he
sees no rigid, separate institution, but the living Body of the
incarnate Christ."62 The early Franciscans exhibited a certain

autonomy from, and healthy suspicion of, the prevailing
institutional authorities. Yet, the sense of vocation, humility,
participation, solidarity, and self-sacrifice led them to an
anthropological perspective that transformed the structures of
medieval government and church.
E. Anthropology Reformulated
To pose the anthropological question in a theological context
may certainly seem somewhat novel to the secular jurist. What
possible connection could there be between theological insight
and law in the modern liberal state? More specifically, given the
pluralism of the modern secular society, the christocentric
paradigm of self-emptying love seems to have little relevance,
and may even be offensive to some. The plurality opinion in
Casey observed: "Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State."63 At the same time, it seems perhaps just as bizarre
that a tradition-bound institution, such as the United States
Supreme Court, apparently feels free to jettison history and
overlook the anthropological assumptions of its jurisprudence.
The definition of the human person is at issue every time the
60 Id. at 513.
61 BALTHASAR, supra note 23, at 162-63.
62 Id. at 135.

63 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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High Court renders a decision that considers the profound
question as to whether or not human life in the womb merits any
level of constitutional protection. 64 Certainly, it cannot be a
question of imposing a certain religious understanding of human
person unto the law of the state. Even if such an approach were
possible, it would be quite undesirable. Among other problems,
it would tend to erode the freedom guaranteed by democratic
law. Rather, the theological anthropology may offer insight into
the human person that serves to afford a more balanced idea of
freedom and a more complete account of the human good. It is
intellectually barren to ignore the traditional religious
anthropology and proceed, as if in a historical vacuum, in the
reinvention of what it means to be human.
The religious understanding of the human person, as
illustrated here by the Franciscan perspective, teaches that true
freedom subsists not in the assertion of individuality alone, but
from participation and solidarity with others in a common
endeavor. 65 This is the antidote to the alienation, which is a
poisonous byproduct of anthropology focused on the radically
autonomous individual. Thus, theological anthropology offers
the law the insight that legal relationships need not be defined
exclusively in terms of individual rights. It informs the law that
a balanced notion of human freedom involves the correct
proportions between individual rights and responsibilities. The
definition of freedom as the absence of restraint needs the
corrective supplement that one constitutes oneself as a human
person by giving oneself away. Bonaventure recognized that the
mere assertion of moral doctrine was to ignore its inner logic.
Instead, reflection of the religious experience of Francis led
Bonaventure to the conclusion that the understanding and
acceptance of the traditional moral order required a prior
anthropology. Only through self-sacrificial love could the human
being possess the poverty and humility to know and love the
immutable truth. As society experiences the kind of epochal
transformation described by Cardinal Ratzinger, it might find
direction in navigating the uncharted course by a legal order
that does not repudiate traditional Christian anthropology.

64 See id. at 851.

65 See Michelman, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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Such an anthropological perspective would provide a
necessary supplement to the account of the human good
functioning within the legal order of the modern liberal state.
When freedom is defined as the absence of constraint on the
individual, the law tends to focus on the protection of individual
legal rights. Legal relationships are defined primarily in terms
of individual rights, and this language of rights may sometimes
obscure the common good. For example, the interaction between
the law and anthropological assumptions is critical to society
since the family unit constitutes the societal foundation. A
system of law that is primarily concerned with individual rights
may not readily enhance the goal of supporting family life.
Indeed, the language of individual rights may result in a legal
culture that seems hostile to the family unit. Pursuant to the
liberal anthropology, the traditional understanding of the family
could be seen merely as a legal relationship consisting of any set
of willing participants, who may initiate and terminate the
relationship at whim. Not only does such a subjective notion
reject the wisdom of tradition, it also threatens to destabilize
society itself. In contrast, human experience teaches that a
stable and healthy family requires self-sacrifice on the part of
the spouses and their progeny.
The traditional religious
understanding of the human person offers balance to the legal
order based upon the anthropology of liberal political theory. As
a compliment to autonomy and suspicion, equilibrium might be
restored by a recognition of the human person as a spiritual
being created in the dignity of the divine image who finds
meaning in solidarity with others through acts of participation
and self-sacrifice.
III. LEGAL EDUCATION
The anthropological problem posed by liberal theory may be
corrected through Franciscan anthropology. The Franciscan
anthropological corrective can be applied to rights language, the
protection of innocent human life, and the traditional religious
understanding of the family. Moreover, the anthropological
assumptions embedded within our legal culture raise a host of
questions for legal educators in religiously affiliated law schools.
Utilizing Franciscan theology and spirituality, the remainder of

20001

WHAT IT MEANS TO BE HUMAN

this article will focus on three issues: vocation, participation, and
hope.
First, given the various faith traditions that have played an
important role in the foundations of our respective institutions,
what do we communicate to our students about the selfunderstanding of being a lawyer? In the religious understanding
of the human person, as exemplified here by the Franciscan
insight, the spiritual or interior life constitutes the unifying and
dynamic force of all of one's projects and endeavors. As a young
man, Francis of Assisi spent time discerning his vocation. Do we
encourage and nourish such discernment of vocation among our
own students? Do we even consider law a profession, in the
sense inherited from the Medieval Universities, such that it
involves a vocation to a higher good for a noble purpose?
Second, what is the image of human fulfillment that we
present to our students? Upon graduation, do students go forth
primarily as radically autonomous individuals anxious to
compete in the market place so as to satisfy subjective desires?
Or, do they realize the importance of participation and solidarity
with other human beings in family life, in religious associations,
and other fundamental communal forms of human fulfillment.
Does the ideal of human happiness depend primarily on prestige,
victory, and financial gain? What do we communicate to our
students about the ontological dignity of every human person?
Does the wisdom of paradoxical self-sacrifice for the common
good, at least occasionally, enter one's consciousness?
Third, does the process of legal education leave our students
disconnected from history? Without memory of the past, how is
it possible for the human person to form hope for the future? If
our teaching depends solely on prevailing economic, political,
and social critiques, do we breed cynicism among future lawyers
about the rule of law and its relation to fundamental human
goods? Does not a knowledge of tradition and custom, which
were the fonts of the common law, afford a wisdom about the
present? Does our educational process result in a professional
training that affords hope for the future?
The dignity of the human person is not enhanced by
juridical structures that encourage the radically autonomous
individual. At its worst, the political theory of the modern
liberal state leaves the human person disconnected from history,
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isolated in the present, and unconcerned for the future. In
contrast to that quality of meaning available through the pursuit
of the private good alone, the theological paradigm offers the
hope that the human person might discover the fuller
possibilities through solidarity with others. As one author
describes it: "The commandment of love is also the measure of
the tasks and demands that have to be faced by all men-all
persons and all communities-if the whole good contained in the
66
acting and being 'together with other' is to become a reality."
Perhaps, then it is not so farfetched to speak of loving selfsacrifice for the greater good as having something to contribute
even to secular culture and legal structures. To conclude with
the words of St. Bonaventure:
For the glory of the kingdom to be perfect, there is required not
only exalted power but also resplendent wisdom so that the
government of the kingdom is directed not by arbitrary decision
but by the brilliant rays of the eternal laws emanating without
deception from the light of wisdom. And this wisdom is written
in Christ Jesus, as the book of life in which God the Father has
"hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge." (Col. 2: 3).67

66 WOJTYLA, supra note 19, at 298-99.

67 The Latin translation is as follows:
Ad gloriam regni perfectam non solum requiritur potestas excellans,
verum etium sapientia fulgens, ut non secundum indeterminatae
voluntatis arbitrium disponantur gubernacula regni, sed secundum
fulgores aeternarum legum a luce sapientiae indecepte manantium. Et
haec quidem sapientia scripta est in Christo Iesu tanquam in libro vitae, in
quo omnes thesauros sapientiae et scientiae ....
BALTHASAR, supra note 23, at 84.

